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One of the world’s foremost 
economic historians explains 
the forces behind the develop-
ment of modern central banks, 
providing insight into their role 
in the ﬁ  nancial system and the 
economy.
A central bank is the term used to 
describe the authority responsible for 
policies that affect a country’s supply 
of money and credit. More speciﬁ  cally, 
a central bank uses its tools of mon-
etary policy—open market operations, 
discount window lending, changes in 
reserve requirements—to affect short-
term interest rates and the monetary 
base (currency held by the public plus 
bank reserves) in order to achieve 
important policy goals.
There are three key goals of modern 
monetary policy. The ﬁ  rst and most 
important is price stability or stabil-
ity in the value of money. Today this 
means maintaining a sustained low rate 
of inﬂ  ation. The second goal is a stable 
real economy, often interpreted as high 
employment and high and sustain-
able economic growth. Another way to 
put it is to say that monetary policy is 
expected to smooth the business cycle 
and offset shocks to the economy. The 
third goal is ﬁ  nancial stability. This 
encompasses an efﬁ  cient and smoothly 
running payments system and the pre-
vention of ﬁ  nancial crises.
 Beginnings
The story of central banking goes back 
at least to the seventeenth century, to 
the founding of the ﬁ  rst institution rec-
ognized as a central bank, the Swed-
ish Riksbank. Established in 1668 as 
a joint stock bank, it was chartered to 
lend the government funds and to act as 
a clearing house for commerce. A few 
decades later (1694), the most famous 
central bank of the era, the Bank of 
England, was founded also as a joint 
stock company to purchase government 
debt. Other central banks were set up 
later in Europe for similar purposes, 
though some were established to deal 
with monetary disarray. For example, 
the Banque de France was established 
by Napoleon in 1800 to stabilize the 
currency after the hyperinﬂ  ation of 
paper money during the French Revo-
lution, as well as to aid in government 
ﬁ  nance. Early central banks issued pri-
vate notes which served as currency, 
and they often had a monopoly over 
such note issue. 
While these early central banks 
helped fund the government’s 
debt, they were also private enti-
ties that engaged in banking activi-
ties. Because they held the deposits 
of other banks, they came to serve as 
banks for bankers, facilitating trans-
actions between banks or providing 
other banking services. They became 
the repository for most banks in the 
banking system because of their large 
reserves and extensive networks of 
correspondent banks. These factors 
allowed them to become the lender 
of last resort in the face of a ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. In other words, they became 
willing to provide emergency cash to 
their correspondents in times of ﬁ  nan-
cial distress. 
 Transition
The Federal Reserve System belongs 
to a later wave of central banks, which 
emerged at the turn of the twentieth 
century. These banks were created 
primarily to consolidate the various 
instruments that people were using for 
currency and to provide ﬁ  nancial sta-
bility. Many also were created to man-
age the gold standard, to which most 
countries adhered. 
The gold standard, which prevailed 
until 1914, meant that each country 
deﬁ  ned its currency in terms of a ﬁ  xed 
weight of gold. Central banks held 
large gold reserves to ensure that their 
notes could be converted into gold, as 
was required by their charters. When 
their reserves declined because of a 
balance of payments deﬁ  cit or adverse 
domestic circumstances, they would 
raise their discount rates (the interest 
rates at which they would lend money 
to the other banks). Doing so would 
raise interest rates more generally, 
which in turn attracted foreign invest-
ment, thereby bringing more gold into 
the country. 
Central banks adhered to the gold 
standard’s rule of maintaining gold 
convertibility above all other consid-
erations. Gold convertibility served as 
the economy’s nominal anchor. That 
is, the amount of money banks could 
supply was constrained by the value 
of the gold they held in reserve, and 
this in turn determined the prevail-
ing price level. And because the price 
level was tied to a known commodity 
whose long-run value was determined 
by market forces, expectations about 
the future price level were tied to it as 
well. In a sense, early central banks 
were strongly committed to price sta-
bility. They did not worry too much 
about one of the modern goals of cen-
tral banking—the stability of the real 
economy—because they were con-
strained by their obligation to adhere to 
the gold standard. Central banks of this era also learned 
to act as lenders of last resort in times 
of ﬁ  nancial stress—when events like 
bad harvests, defaults by railroads, or 
wars precipitated a scramble for liquid-
ity (in which depositors ran to their 
banks and tried to convert their depos-
its into cash). The lesson began early 
in the nineteenth century as a conse-
quence of the Bank of England’s rou-
tine response to such panics. At the 
time, the Bank (and other European 
central banks) would often protect their 
own gold reserves ﬁ  rst, turning away 
their correspondents in need. Doing 
so precipitated major panics in 1825, 
1837, 1847, and 1857, and led to severe 
criticism of the Bank. In response, the 
Bank adopted the “responsibility doc-
trine,” proposed by the economic writer 
Walter Bagehot, which required the 
Bank to subsume its private interest to 
the public interest of the banking sys-
tem as a whole. The Bank began to fol-
low Bagehot’s rule, which was to lend 
freely on the basis of any sound col-
lateral offered—but at a penalty rate 
(that is, above market rates) to prevent 
moral hazard. The bank learned its les-
son well. No ﬁ  nancial crises occurred 
in England for nearly 150 years after 
1866. It wasn’t until August 2007 that 
the country experienced its next crisis.
The U.S. experience was most interest-
ing. It had two central banks in the early 
nineteenth century, the Bank of the 
United States (1791–1811) and a sec-
ond Bank of the United States (1816–
1836). Both were set up on the model 
of the Bank of England, but unlike the 
British, Americans bore a deep-seated 
distrust of any concentration of ﬁ  nan-
cial power in general, and of central 
banks in particular, so that in each case, 
the charters were not renewed.
There followed an 80-year period char-
acterized by considerable ﬁ  nancial 
instability. Between 1836 and the onset 
of the Civil War—a period known as 
the Free Banking Era—states allowed 
virtual free entry into banking with 
minimal regulation. Throughout the 
period, banks failed frequently, and 
several banking panics occurred. The 
payments system was notoriously inef-
ﬁ  cient, with thousands of dissimilar-
looking state bank notes and counter-
feits in circulation. In response, the 
government created the national bank-
ing system during the Civil War. While 
the system improved the efﬁ  ciency of 
the payments system by providing a 
uniform currency based on national 
bank notes, it still provided no lender 
of last resort, and the era was rife with  
severe banking panics.
The crisis of 1907 was the straw that 
broke the camel’s back. It led to the 
creation of the Federal Reserve in 
1913, which was given the mandate of 
providing a uniform and elastic cur-
rency (that is, one which would accom-
modate the seasonal, cyclical, and sec-
ular movements in the economy) and 
to serve as a lender of last resort. 
 The Genesis of Modern 
Central Banking Goals
Before 1914, central banks didn’t 
attach great weight to the goal of main-
taining the domestic economy’s stabil-
ity. This changed after World War I, 
when they began to be concerned 
about employment, real activity, and 
the price level. The shift reﬂ  ected a 
change in the political economy of 
many countries—suffrage was expand-
ing, labor movements were rising, and 
restrictions on migration were being 
set. In the 1920s, the Fed began focus-
sing on both external stability (which 
meant keeping an eye on gold reserves, 
because the U.S. was still on the gold 
standard) and internal stability (which 
meant keeping an eye on prices, out-
put, and employment). But as long as 
the gold standard prevailed, external 
goals dominated.
Unfortunately, the Fed’s monetary pol-
icy led to serious problems in the 1920s 
and 1930s. When it came to managing 
the nation’s quantity of money, the Fed 
followed a principle called the real bills 
doctrine. The doctrine argued that the 
quantity of money needed in the econ-
omy would naturally be supplied so 
long as Reserve Banks lent funds only 
when banks presented eligible self-liq-
uidating commercial paper for collat-
eral. One corollary of the real bills doc-
trine was that the Fed should not permit 
bank lending to ﬁ  nance stock market 
speculation, which explains why it fol-
lowed a tight policy in 1928 to offset 
the Wall Street boom. The policy led 
to the beginning of recession in August 
1929 and the stock market crash in 
October. Then, in the face of a series 
of banking panics between 1930 and 
1933, the Fed failed to act as a lender 
of last resort. As a result, the money 
supply collapsed, and massive deﬂ  ation 
and depression followed. The Fed erred 
because the real bills doctrine led it to 
interpret the prevailing low short-term 
nominal interest rates as a sign of mon-
etary ease, and they believed no banks 
needed funds because very few member 
banks came to the discount window. 
After the Great Depression, the Fed-
eral Reserve System was reorganized. 
The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 
shifted power deﬁ  nitively from the 
Reserve Banks to the Board of Gov-
ernors. In addition, the Fed was made 
subservient to the Treasury.
The Fed regained its independence 
from the Treasury in 1951, where-
upon it began following a deliberate 
countercyclical policy under the direc-
torship of William McChesney Mar-
tin. During the 1950s this policy was 
quite successful in ameliorating sev-
eral recessions and in maintaining low 
inﬂ  ation. At the time, the United States 
and the other advanced countries were 
part of the Bretton Woods System, 
under which the U.S. pegged the dollar 
to gold at $35 per ounce and the other 
countries pegged to the dollar. The link 
to gold may have carried over some of 
the credibility of a nominal anchor and 
helped to keep inﬂ  ation low.
The picture changed dramatically in 
the 1960s when the Fed began fol-
lowing a more activist stabilization 
policy. In this decade it shifted its pri-
orities from low inﬂ  ation toward high 
employment. Possible reasons include 
the adoption of Keynesian ideas and 
the belief in the Phillips curve trade-off 
between inﬂ  ation and unemployment. 
The consequence of the shift in policy 
was the buildup of inﬂ  ationary pres-
sures from the late 1960s until the end 
of the 1970s. The causes of the Great 
Inﬂ  ation are still being debated, but 
many economists view the Fed’s policy 
during this era as faulty. The restrain-
ing inﬂ  uence of the nominal anchor dis-
appeared, and for the next two decades, 
inﬂ  ation expectations took off.
The inﬂ  ation ended with the Fed’s 
aggressive anti-inﬂ  ation policy from 
1979 to 1982, which involved mone-
tary tightening and the raising of policy 
interest rates to double digits. The pol-
icy led to a sharp recession, but it was 
successful in breaking the back of high 
inﬂ  ation expectations. In the following 
decades, inﬂ  ation declined signiﬁ  cantly 
and has stayed low ever since. Since the early 1990s the Fed has followed 
a policy of implicit inﬂ  ation targeting, 
using the federal funds rate as its policy 
instrument. In many respects, the pol-
icy regime currently followed echoes 
the convertibility principle of the gold 
standard, in the sense that the public 
has come to believe in the credibility of 
the Fed’s commitment to low inﬂ  ation.
A key force in the history of central 
banking has been central bank inde-
pendence. The original central banks 
were private and independent. They 
depended on the government to main-
tain their charters but were otherwise 
free to choose their own tools and poli-
cies. Their goals were constrained by 
gold convertibility. In the twentieth 
century, most of these central banks 
were nationalized and completely lost 
their independence. Their policies were 
dictated by the ﬁ  scal authorities. The 
Fed regained its independence after 
1951, but its independence is not abso-
lute. It must report to Congress, which 
ultimately has the power to change 
the Federal Reserve Act. Other central 
banks had to wait until the 1990s to 
regain their independence. 
 Financial Stability
An increasingly important role for cen-
tral banks is ﬁ  nancial stability. The 
evolution of this responsibility has 
been similar across the advanced coun-
tries. In the gold standard era, central 
banks developed a lender-of-last-resort 
function, following Bagehot’s rule. 
But ﬁ  nancial systems became unstable 
between the world wars, as widespread 
banking crises plagued the early 1920s 
and the 1930s. The U.S. experience 
was the worst. The response to bank-
ing crises in Europe at the time was 
generally to bail out the troubled banks 
with public funds. This approach was 
later adopted by the United States with 
the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, but on a limited scale. After the 
Depression, every country established 
a ﬁ  nancial safety net, comprising 
deposit insurance and heavy regulation 
that included interest rate ceilings and 
ﬁ  rewalls between ﬁ  nancial and com-
mercial institutions. As a result, there 
were no banking crises from the late 
1930s until the mid-1970s anywhere in 
the advanced world.
This changed dramatically in the 
1970s. The Great Inﬂ  ation undermined 
interest rate ceilings and inspired 
ﬁ  nancial innovations designed to cir-
cumvent the ceilings and other restric-
tions. These innovations led to dereg-
ulation and increased competition. 
Banking instability reemerged in the 
United States and abroad, with such 
examples of large-scale ﬁ  nancial dis-
turbances as the failures of Frank-
lin National in 1974 and Continental 
Illinois in 1984 and the savings and 
loan crisis in the 1980s. The reaction 
to these disturbances was to bail out 
banks considered too big to fail, a reac-
tion which likely increased the possi-
bility of moral hazard. Many of these 
issues were resolved by the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 and the Basel 
I Accords, which emphasized the hold-
ing of bank capital as a way to encour-
age prudent behavior.
Another problem that has reemerged 
in modern times is that of asset booms 
and busts. Stock market and housing 
booms are often associated with the 
business cycle boom phase, and busts 
often trigger economic downturns. 
Orthodox central bank policy is to not 
defuse booms before they turn to busts 
for fear of triggering a recession but to 
react after the bust occurs and to sup-
ply ample liquidity to protect the pay-
ments and banking systems. This was 
the policy followed by Alan Greenspan 
after the stock market crash of 1987. 
It was also the policy followed later 
in the incipient ﬁ  nancial crises of the 
1990s and 2000s. Ideally, the policies 
should remove the excess liquidity 
once the threat of crisis has passed.
 Challenges for the Future
The key challenge I see facing central 
banks in the future will be to balance 
their three policy goals. The primary 
goal of the central bank is to provide 
price stability (currently viewed as low 
inﬂ  ation over a long-run period). This 
goal requires credibility to work. In 
other words, people need to believe that 
the central bank will tighten its policy 
if inﬂ  ation threatens. This belief needs 
to be backed by actions. Such was the 
case in the mid-1990s when the Fed 
tightened in response to an inﬂ  ation 
scare. Such a strategy can be greatly 
enhanced by good communication.
The second policy goal is stability and 
growth of the real economy. Consider-
able evidence suggests that low inﬂ  a-
tion is associated with better growth 
and overall macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, big shocks still 
occur, threatening to derail the econ-
omy from its growth path. When such 
situations threaten, research also sug-
gests that the central bank should tem-
porarily depart from its long-run inﬂ  a-
tion goal and ease monetary policy to 
offset recessionary forces. Moreover, if 
market agents believe in the long-run 
credibility of the central bank’s com-
mitment to low inﬂ  ation, the cut in pol-
icy interest rates will not engender high 
inﬂ  ation expectations. Once the reces-
sion is avoided or has played its course, 
the central bank needs to raise rates and 
return to its low-inﬂ  ation goal. 
The third policy goal is ﬁ  nancial sta-
bility. Research has shown that it also 
will be improved in an environment of 
low inﬂ  ation, although some econo-
mists argue that asset price booms are 
spawned in such an environment. In 
the case of an incipient ﬁ  nancial crisis 
such as that just witnessed in August 
2007, the current view is that the 
course of policy should be to provide 
whatever liquidity is required to allay 
the fears of the money market. An open 
discount window and the acceptance of 
whatever sound collateral is offered are 
seen as the correct prescription. More-
over, most monetary economists agree 
that the funds should be offered at a 
penalty rate. The Fed followed these 
rules in September 2007, although the 
bulk of funds were provided through 
open market operations. Once the crisis 
is over, which generally is in a matter 
of days or weeks, the central bank must 
remove the excess liquidity and return 
to its inﬂ  ation objective. 
The Federal Reserve followed this 
strategy after Y2K. When no ﬁ  nancial 
crisis occurred, it promptly withdrew 
the massive infusion of liquidity it had 
provided. By contrast, after providing 
funds following the attacks of 9/11 and 
the technology bust of 2001, it permit-
ted the additional funds to remain in the 
money market once the threat of crisis 
was over in order to resist deﬂ  ation-
ary pressures. Some economists assert 
that if the markets had not been infused 
with so much liquidity for so long, 
interest rates would not have been as 
low in recent years as they have been, 
and the housing boom might not have 
as expanded as much as it did.
A second challenge related to the ﬁ  rst is 
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ﬁ  nancial innovations, which can derail 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Innovations in the 
ﬁ  nancial markets are a challenge to deal 
with, as they represent attempts to cir-
cumvent regulation as well as to reduce 
transactions costs and enhance leverage. 
The recent subprime crisis exempli-
ﬁ  es the danger, as many problems were 
caused by derivatives created to pack-
age mortgages of dubious quality with 
sounder ones so the instruments could 
be unloaded off the balance sheets of 
some ﬁ  nancial institutions. This strat-
egy, designed to dissipate risk, may have 
backﬁ  red because of the opacity of the 
new instruments.
A third challenge facing the Federal 
Reserve in particular is whether to 
adopt an explicit inﬂ  ation targeting 
objective like the Bank of England, 
the Bank of Canada, and other central 
banks. The advantages of doing so are 
that it simpliﬁ  es policy and makes it 
more transparent, which eases commu-
nication with the public and enhances 
credibility. However, it might be difﬁ  -
cult to combine an explicit target with 
the Fed’s dual mandate of price stabil-
ity and high employment. 
A fourth challenge for all central banks 
is to account for globalization and 
other supply-side developments, such 
as political instability and oil price and 
other shocks, which are outside of their 
control but which may affect global 
and domestic prices.
The ﬁ  nal challenge I wish to mention 
concerns whether implicit or explicit 
inﬂ  ation targeting should be replaced 
with price-level targeting, whereby 
inﬂ  ation would be kept at zero percent. 
Research has shown that a price level 
may be the superior target, because it 
avoids the problem of base drift (where 
inﬂ  ation is allowed to cumulate), and 
it also has less long-run price uncer-
tainty. The disadvantage is that reces-
sionary shocks might cause a deﬂ  ation, 
where the price level declines. This 
possibility should not be a problem if 
the nominal anchor is credible, because 
the public would realize that inﬂ  ation-
ary and deﬂ  ationary episodes are tran-
sitory and prices will always revert to 
their mean, that is, toward stability. 
Such a strategy is not likely to be 
adopted in the near future because cen-
tral banks are concerned that deﬂ  ation 
might get out of control or be associ-
ated with recession on account of nomi-
nal rigidities. In addition, the transition 
would involve reducing inﬂ  ation expec-
tations from the present plateau of about 
2 percent, which would likely involve 
deliberately engineering a recession—a 
policy not likely to ever be popular.